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Abstract
This paper shows that convexity of the short-run Phillips curve
is a source of positive inflation bias even when policymakers target
the natural unemployment rate, that is when they operate with pru-
dent discretion, and their loss function is symmetric. Optimal mon-
etary policy also induces positive co-movement between average in-
flation, average unemployment and inflation variability–suggesting a
new motive for inflation stabilization policy–and positively skewed
unemployment distributions. The reduced form model is applied to
the post-disinflation period (1986-2006) in developed countries and its
properties are illustrated numerically for the United States.
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1 Introduction
A voluminous body of research has investigated the inflation bias result that
average inflation exceeds the policymaker’s inflation target.1 There are three
possible reasons for excess inflation: (a) the policymaker has a short-term
incentive to lower unemployment below the natural rate, as in the Barro and
Gordon (1983) framework; (b) monetary policy preferences are nonquadratic
(asymmetric) such that, typically, unemployment deviations above target
are weighted more than those below target; and (c) the short-run inflation-
unemployment tradeoﬀ is driven by a nonlinear (convex) Phillips curve.
The key premise of this paper is that, in addition to inflation bias, hypoth-
esis (c) is consistent with the positive relationship between average inflation,
average unemployment and inflation variability, and can also generate asym-
metric (positively skewed) unemployment distributions. In order to examine
the role of the Phillips curve, we study discretionary monetary policy under
hypothesis (c) in a one-period model with complete information and sym-
metric policy preferences. The departure from certainty equivalence driving
the model’s equilibrium properties is then only due to the convex (nonlinear)
inflation-unemployment tradeoﬀ.
We are motivated by two stylized empirical observations. First, the wide-
spread adoption of inflation targeting in developed countries over the past
two decades has meant that, in the absence of institutional precommitment,
policymakers may behave with prudent discretion, whereby the central bank
knows the natural rate in each period and never wants unemployment to
diﬀer from it. The presence of an expansionary motive (U∗ < UN , or k < 1)
has been challenged by Blinder (2000), McCallum (1997) and Gerlach (2003),
among others, on the grounds that monetary policymakers do not systemat-
ically attempt to raise output above potential because they know that doing
so is inflationary. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) suggest that the unemploy-
ment target may have been time-varying: less than the natural rate in the
1970s, but rising along with the drive towards central bank independence in
industrialized countries, such that prudent discretion (U∗ = UN , or k = 1)
became feasible since the mid-1980s.2
Further, the level and variance of inflation in developed economies are
positively correlated, over time and in cross-section; for recent surveys see
1Walsh (2003) reviews the sources of the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
2Svensson (1997) also argues that inflation targeting cannot be credibly implemented
unless k = 1.
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Kiley (2000, 2007). To the extent that this correlation persists in the recent
post-disinflation period where setting k = 1 is reasonable, an important
consequence is that a prudent central bank should aim for stable inflation,
as that is also lower on average. Inflation stabilization policy then has a
first-order eﬀect on social welfare.
Cukierman (2000) was the first to derive inflation bias by highlighting the
asymmetry between hypotheses (a) and (b), that is when the unemployment
target is the natural rate, and the loss is zero for negative unemployment
deviations from target but increases quadratically for positive deviations.
Subsequently, students of monetary policy have been exploring the nonlinear
reaction functions arising from asymmetric policy preferences, and empirical
support has been found for the U.S., G7 and OECD countries by Ruge-
Murcia (2003a, 2004).3 Analytically, a shortcoming of these models is that,
in order to show that inflation bias is positive when k = 1, they require nor-
mally distributed inflation shocks (Gerlach (2003), Nobay and Peel (2003)),
or uncertainty about economic conditions (Cukierman (2000), Cukierman
and Gerlach (2003)), in addition to asymmetric policy preferences.
Against this background, the contributions of this paper are threefold.
First, we identify the component of equilibrium inflation bias under convex-
ity that was obtained generally by Dolado et al. (2005). As this component
arises under prudent discretion (k = 1), it suggests an additional source of
time inconsistency, one stemming from the interaction of the convex Phillips
curve and the shock distribution. Excess average inflation arises because
average unemployment in a stochastic convex economy exceeds the natural
rate; see Laxton et al. (1999).4 Intuitively, higher unemployment reduces in-
flation less than lower unemployment increases it, so the first-order condition
requires average inflation to also exceed its target. As the associated bias is
unambiguously positive, it may have normative implications for the design
of monetary institutions such as inflation targets.
Second, unlike the linear-symmetric model, we show that the convex-
symmetric reduced form with prudent discretion yields a positive relationship
between average inflation and inflation variability, and between average infla-
tion and average unemployment. The first property suggests that a prudent
3In that literature, the central banker’s “prudence motive” refers to the nonlinear
reaction function due to asymmetric preferences; for example, see Ruge-Murcia (2002)
and van der Ploeg (2004).
4Dolado et al. (2005) also derive a negative output bias, or a positive unemployment
bias if the latter is used in the Phillips curve.
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central bank should aim for stable inflation even in a one-shot game with
no asymmetric information, as inflation stabilization leads to lower average
inflation.5 The second property is important to the extent that developed
countries’ inflation and unemployment rates co-move positively even when
k = 1, which cannot be accounted for by the linear model. Further, regarding
the unemployment rate, the convex-symmetric model can shed light on the
observation that unemployment distributions tend to be positively skewed.
We show that skewed unemployment outcomes are a straightforward equilib-
rium property of discretionary monetary policy under convexity, and provide
simulation evidence to that eﬀect for the U.S.
Third, alongside the analytical focus on prudent discretion, the paper’s
empirical application is to the post-disinflation (“Great Moderation”) period
from 1986:1 to 2006:4. The advantage of this time period is that macroeco-
nomic stability has arguably been achieved in most developed countries; see
OECD (2002). Eﬀectively, investigating the inflation-unemployment nexus
over this period amounts to identifying sources of inflation bias independent
of time-inconsistency issues and/or large adverse supply shocks, such as those
of the 1970s.
The convex Phillips curve functional form in this paper follows Debelle
and Laxton (1997) and Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1999).6 At the aggregate
level, convexity can be traced to the traditional Keynesian assumption that
nominal wages are flexible upwards but rigid downwards, so that inflation is a
decreasing and convex function of the unemployment rate–equivalently, an
increasing function of the output gap; see Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell
(1997). At the microeconomic level, general equilibrium foundations are
related to the principal-agent model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Our reduced form framework is also related to research on the importance
of time-inconsistency in monetary policy. In an influential paper, Ireland
(1999) showed that, while the Barro-Gordon model combined with hypothesis
(a) is capable of explaining the long-term dynamics of U.S. inflation and
unemployment, it cannot account for their short-run behavior. Along these
lines, Ruge-Murcia (2003b) finds that a more general version of Cukierman’s
asymmetric preferences combined with k = 1 is better able to explain the
U.S. data than Barro-Gordon. Albanesi et al. (2003) also show that time-
5The stabilization motive relates to the literature on nonlinear monetary policy rules;
see Orphanides et al. (2006).
6Earlier work on nonlinear Phillips curves includes Clark et al. (1996), Dolado et al.
(2004, 2005), Isard et al. (2003), Nobay and Peel (2000), and Tambakis (1999, 2002).
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inconsistency is not important for a wide range of parameter values in a
general equilibrium model. Thus, prudent discretion oﬀers a good operating
environment for monetary policy during the “Great Moderation” period.
In the remainder of the paper, section 2 reviews the stylized facts on
inflation and unemployment in advanced economies; Section 3 reviews the
linear model; Section 4 presents the convex Phillips curve and derives optimal
monetary policy when k = 1; Section 5 applies the linear and convex models
to international data and illustrates the latter’s properties numerically for
the U.S.; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Inflation and unemployment: stylized facts
The quarterly U.S. inflation and unemployment data for the period 1955:1-
2006:4 are shown below7
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Figure 1: Quarterly inflation and unemployment rates, United States
7Inflation is the annualized quarterly percentage change of the GDP implicit price defla-
tor. Source: IMF, IFS. Unemployment is the quarterly seasonally adjusted Standardized
Unemployment Rates (SUR). Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators.
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The two time series clearly co-move in the long run.8 Their correlation
coeﬃcient over the whole period is 0.34, declining to 0.19 from 1986:1-2006:4.
This subperiod–highlighted by a vertical line in Figure 1–is arguably more
relevant for prudent monetary policy, since the disinflation process from the
high inflation of the 1970s has been completed. Note, also, that long-run
correlations are more likely to be spurious: King and Watson (1997) find
a significant break in the behavior of inflation and unemployment occuring
around 1970.
Turning to the link between inflation and its variability, we consider 20
OECD economies over the period 1986:1-2006:4 (84 observations/ country).9
A positive relationship is apparent from Figure 2 below
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Figure 2: Average inflation and inflation variability in OECD countries
8Ireland (1999) found that U.S. inflation and unemployment time series are non-
stationary and cointegrated using 1960:1-1997:2 data. We find a single cointegrating vector
for 1986:1-2006:4; the test results are available upon request.
9We have excluded Greece and Portugal, the two moderate-to-high inflation countries
in the cross-section, and Mexico and South Korea because they experienced financial crises
and large currency fluctuations since the mid-1990s.
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Importantly, the correlation persists when discretionary monetary policy
is prudent, in the sense of targeting the natural rate (k = 1). Table 1
highlights this by reporting five inflation-targeting countries’ average inflation
and inflation variability, from the date each implemented inflation targeting,
denoted IT, as well as from 1986:1 through to 2006:4
Table 1. Inflation targeters’ performance10
IT -2006:4 1986:1-2006:4
Eπ σπ Eπ σπ
Australia, 1993:3 2.66 1.50 3.78 2.64
Canada, 1991:2 2.03 1.14 2.66 1.51
New Zealand, 1990:1 2.33 1.48 3.85 4.09
Sweden, 1993:2 1.39 1.26 3.01 2.96
United Kingdom, 1993:1 1.76 0.60 2.87 1.92
Inflation and its variance co-move in all five inflation-targeting economies;
the decline is more pronounced for Sweden and the UK because of the sharp
devaluation of those countries’ currencies following the ERM exchange rate
crisis of September 1992. Hence, a rationale for active inflation stabilization
policy is that it reduces average inflation also under prudent discretion, which
characterizes the post-disinflation period. This stylized fact cannot be ex-
plained by the linear Barro-Gordon framework, where the first two moments
of inflation are independent of each other. Put diﬀerently, the benefits of
inflation stabilization policy appear to persist even after time-inconsistency
problems have been overcome (k = 1) and an independent central bank has
been established.
Developed country evidence also suggests that unemployment distrib-
utions are asymmetric and positively skewed. Table 2 below reports the
skewness of unemployment rates in the inflation-targeting countries for the
historical period starting in 1955:1, and for the post-disinflation period start-
ing in 1986:1. The U.S. has also been included for comparison purposes.
10IT is the first quarter, reported next to each country’s name, following the calendar
month when it adopted inflation targeting. Source: Dotsey (2006).
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Table 2. Unemployment skewness11
1955:1-2006:4 1986:1-2006:4
Australia −0.29† 0.38
Canada 0.23 0.47∗
New Zealand n/a 0.58∗
Sweden 0.77∗∗ −0.12†
United Kingdom 0.23∗∗ 0.37∗
United States 0.75∗∗ 0.26
With the exception of Sweden, in the post-disinflation period the unem-
ployment distribution has an asymmetric right tail, and the departure from
normality, due to excess skewness and/or kurtosis, is significant for Canada,
New Zealand and the U.K. Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) find that long-run
OECD unemployment data is highly nonlinear, but do not address skewness.
3 The linear-symmetric benchmark
In the reduced-form tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983)–henceforth referred to as the linear-symmetric model–
monetary policy minimizes expected quadratic losses
Et−1Lt = Et−1[(Ut − U∗)2 + b(πt − π∗)2] (1)
π∗ ≥ 0 and U∗ = kUN (k ≤ 1) are the one-period inflation and unemploy-
ment targets, UN is the natural rate of unemployment, and b > 0 is the
relative weight on inflation stabilization. The short-term surprise motive is
zero only if k = 1, that is when policymakers operate with prudent discretion.
The economy is described by a linear short-run Phillips curve
πt = πet + β(U
N − Ut)− εt , (2)
where 1/β is the constant sacrifice ratio and εt ∼ (0, σε) is an independently
and identically distributed (iid) aggregate supply shock. Alternatively, εt can
be interpreted as an inflation control error as in Ireland (1999): πt = πPt + εt
where πPt is planned inflation, and with rational expectations πet = πPt .
11Superscripts ∗∗, ∗ and † denote rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution
at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively, using the Jarque-Bera test on the raw unemployment
rate data. Source: SUR unemployment, OECD Main Economic Indicators.
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The central bank then has no informational advantage over the private
sector. It follows that unemployment fluctuates about the natural rate UN ,
and its distribution is not skewed provided supply shocks are symmetric:
Ut = UN − εtβ . Minimizing (1) subject to (2) delivers positive inflation bias
for all k < 1
Et−1πt = π∗ + (1− k)
UN
bβ
> π∗ (3)
Hence, in the linear-symmetric model, prudent discretion in monetary
policy implies that the inflation rate meets its target on average; average
inflation and unemployment are linearly related provided k < 1; average
inflation is independent of inflation variability regardless of the value of k;
and monetary policy preferences (b) cannot be identified when k = 1, as
inflation bias is then zero. We revisit the last point in Section 6.
4 The convex-symmetric alternative
4.1 The convex Phillips curve
Alternatively, assume the structure of the economy is such that the central
bank minimizes expected symmetric loss function (1) subject to the following
convex short-run Phillips curve
πt = πet + γ
UN − Ut
Ut − ϕ
− εt , 0 ≤ ϕ < UN (4)
In equation (4), due to Debelle and Laxton (1997) and Laxton et al. (1999),
εt is defined as in the linear case (2). ϕ ≥ 0 is minimum unemployment,
reflecting economy-wide short term capacity constraints, while −γ < 0 is a
horizontal asymptote defining the maximum unanticipated deflation if excess
supply became unbounded. The Phillips curve becomes vertical as γ →∞.
The key equilbrium property of a convex short-run Phillips curve is that
average unemployment exceeds the natural rate in a stochastic economy with
symmetric shocks. Thus, a ±1% inflation shock leads to Et−1Ut > UN . This
departure from certainty equivalence–described in Laxton et al. (1999)–
is independent of any loss function asymmetry and robust to the nonlinear
functional form.12
12Dolado et al. (2004) adopt the same Phillips curve expressed in terms of the output
gap. Nobay and Peel (2000) use a linex functional form due to Varian (1974) and Zellner
(1986) that has also been used to capture asymmetric policy preferences.
8
Convexity implies that the tradeoﬀ between unanticipated inflation and
unemployment improves continuously in the current unemployment rate, in
contrast to the linear Phillips curve where the sacrifice ratio is constant.
Diﬀerentiating (4), the slope of the Phillips curve is
∂Ut
∂πt
= − (Ut − ϕ)
2
γ(UN − ϕ) < 0 (5)
As unemployment declines below the natural rate, excess demand for labor
and, hence, wage inflation grow disproportionately. Such structural state-
dependence was originally suggested in Phillips’s (1958) pioneering work for
the UK.13 It features in Taylor rules where the interest rate response depends
on the current output gap (Clarida et al. (1999)), in nonlinear Taylor rules
(Dolado et al. (2005), Orphanides et al. (2006)), and in models of downward
nominal wage rigidity (Carlsson and Westermark (2008)).
Microfoundations for state-dependence can be found in the principal-
agent framework of Salop (1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In the
latter model, the eﬀective cost to workers for being caught shirking and
becoming unemployed is increasing in their wage, and in the current unem-
ployment rate. With imperfect monitoring of work eﬀort, firms have to pay
disproportionately higher wages when unemployment is low because workers’
incentive to shirk is greater. Conversely, when unemployment is high, firms
find they can lower wages without tempting workers to shirk. As the resulting
wage premium increases smoothly in the state of the economy, a marginal
unemployment decline becomes costlier in terms of unanticipated inflation
than the corresponding marginal increase. Hence, moral hazard generates
job-rationing which must be suﬃciently large to induce labor to work rather
than be caught shirking.
The convex curvature, γ, can thus be traced to labor market conditions.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argue that such equilibrium unemployment–
which increases in monitoring costs, workers’ discount rates, and employers’
costs from shirking–is significant and more likely to be of the blue-collar
type.
The actual unemployment rate in period t follows from equation (4)
Ut =
γUN + ϕεt
γ + εt
(6)
13Phillips argued that inflation’s response to demand pressure is nonlinear and built this
into estimation using the inverse unemployment rate.
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Equation (6) holds regardless of the value of k. Because UN > ϕ, it requires
that εt > −γ for Ut to not diverge. Note that this requirement does not
aﬀect the outcome, as inflation bias is clearly irrelevant in the divergent
case. It suggests that Gaussian (infinite support) inflation control errors are
not essential to the argument.
Further, unlike the linear-symmetric model, in Section 5.2 we show that
simulating policy outcomes using symmetric inflation shocks in equation (6)
induces asymmetric, right-skewed unemployment distributions. Such skew-
ness appears consistent with the empirical evidence reviewed earlier.
4.2 Optimal monetary policy when k = 1
The convex-symmetric model generates strictly positive expected inflation
bias even if k = 1. Minimizing expected loss function (1) subject to convex
Phillips curve (4) yields the expected first-order optimality condition
Et−1πt = π∗ +
1
b
Et−1
∙
−∂Ut
∂πt
(Ut − kUN)
¸
(7)
Note that as average unemployment exceeds kUN for all k ≤ 1, and the
Phillips curve is negatively sloped, the second term in (7) is always positive.
It follows that average inflation has to exceed π∗.
Specifically, setting π∗ = 0 without loss of generality, and substituting
equations (4) and (5) into the first-order condition implies
Et−1πt =
1
bγ(UN − ϕ)Et−1
∙
(Ut − ϕ)2
µ
(1− k)UN + πt − π
e
t
γ
(ϕ− Ut)
¶¸
Applying πt − πet = πt −Et−1πt = εt and (6) to this expression yields
Et−1πt = (1− k)
γUN(UN − ϕ)
b
Et−1
1
(γ + εt)2
(8)
− γ(U
N − ϕ)2
b
Et−1
εt
(γ + εt)3
The first term in (8) is zero when k = 1. Therefore, if positive, the second
term captures expected inflation bias in the absence of time-inconsistency.
In their study of the eﬀects of a quadratic Phillips curve on Taylor policy
rules, Dolado et al. (2005) also break down inflation bias in two components,
one in 1− k and one independent of time-inconsistency.
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The second term’s contribution can be rewritten so that optimal prudent
monetary policy delivers average inflation as follows
Et−1πt = −
γ(UN − ϕ)2
b
Et−1
εt
(γ + εt)3
(9)
= −(U
N − ϕ)2
bγ
Et−1
∙
εt
γ + εt
+
ε3t
(γ + εt)3
− 2 ε
2
t
(γ + εt)2
¸
As εtγ+εt is globally concave provided εt > −γ, the expectation of the first term
in square brackets is negative from Jensen’s inequality. The expectations of
the second and third terms are written as Et−1
h
ε2t
(γ+εt)2
³
εt
γ+εt
− 2
´i
. This
expression is negative for all εt > −2γ, which is always true when εt > −γ.
Premultiplying the square brackets by − (UN−ϕ)2bγ < 0, it follows that the
RHS of (9) is strictly positive. Therefore, it constitutes a lower bound for
expected inflation bias when k = 1. Note that this lower bound would simply
be shifted up by a constant if π∗ > 0.14
The variances of actual inflation and inflation control errors (σ2ε) are
monotonically related when k = 1; to see this, substitute πt = Et−1πt+ εt in
equation (9). Actual inflation then is
πt = −
γ(UN − ϕ)2
b
Et−1
εt
(γ + εt)3
+ εt (10)
implying
var πt =
γ2(UN − ϕ)4
b2
var bθ + σ2ε , (11)
where we define bθ ≡ Et−1 εt(γ+εt)3 = 1T TX
i=1
εi
(γ+εi)3
< 0. Recalling that inflation
shocks are iid, the variance of bθ is just
var bθ = 1
T 2
TX
i=1
var
εi
(γ + εi)3
14Nobay and Peel (2000) obtain equilibrium inflation bias using a linex Phillips curve
functional form. However, the sign of the bias in their model in ambiguous, becoming
positive only with suﬃcient preference uncertainty. Obtaining a closed-form solution also
requires inflation shocks to be conditionally Gaussian.
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Equation (11) then becomes
var πt =
γ2(UN − ϕ)4
b2T 2
TX
i=1
∙
var
εi
(γ + εi)3
¸
+ σ2ε (12)
It follows that inflation variability converges asymptotically to σ2ε.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Phillips curve estimates: developed countries
The linear and convex Phillips curves are assessed for seven developed coun-
tries in the post-disinflation period 1986:1-2006:4, corresponding to k = 1 in
monetary policy. We consider the U.S., France, Germany, and four inflation-
targeting countries from Section 2.
Our estimation procedure aims to facilitate a comparison of the two al-
ternative specifications. Equations (2) and (4) are estimated using OLS. The
underlying convex model is πt = λπet +(1− λ)πt−1+ γf(Ut, UN) + επt , where
f(Ut, UN) = U
N−Ut
Ut−ϕ , and ϕ = 2 percent, following Laxton et al. (1999). The
linear model is πt = λπet +(1−λ)πt−1+β(UN −Ut)+ επt . Expected inflation
for each country is specified as a twelve-quarter distributed lag of past infla-
tion, πet =
¡P12
i=1 πt−i
¢
/12, and intrinsic inflation persistence is represented
by the first lag of πt. The weights on the expected future and lagged inflation
terms must sum to unity to ensure no long-run tradeoﬀ between inflation and
unemployment.
In the estimated models we impose λ = 1 and fix the natural unem-
ployment rate at its period average (84 quarterly observations, except New
Zealand with 62). These restrictions are maintained against evidence of
time-variation in the natural rate and a pure backward-looking component
in inflation. However, given the small sample size, a full econometric in-
vestigation lies beyond the scope of this paper.15 Accordingly, we denote
inflation shocks by επt to draw attention to the fact that the errors are diﬀer-
ent from the theoretical model. The least-squares country estimates of the
linear Phillips curve are reported in Table 3
15Gordon (1997), King and Watson (1997) and Laxton et al. (1999) estimate U.S.
Phillips curves (linear and nonlinear) with a time-varying unobserved natural rate.
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Table 3. Estimated Linear Phillips Curves: 1986:1-2006:416
πt = λπet + β(UN − Ut) + επt β λ LM σε UN (%)
Australia 0.42∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 1.37 2.39 7.4
France 0.26† 0.37∗∗ 2.14∗ 1.48 9.9
Germany 0.03 0.76∗∗ 1.43 2.69 7.6
New Zealand 0.25 -0.34 1.81† 3.69 6.4
Sweden 0.62∗∗ 0.38∗ 1.02 4.67 5.8
United Kingdom 0.15 0.79∗∗ 1.48 2.40 7.2
United States 0.18† 0.85∗∗ 1.41 0.67 5.6
The results indicate that the linear Phillips curve slope is small and not
significant for European Union countries, except Sweden. It is significant for
Australia and less so for the U.S. Note that the U.S. slope estimate, bβ = 0.18
yields an unrealistically large sacrifice ratio. Also, with the exception of
France and the U.S., the country regressions’ estimated standard errors are
large when compared to those in Laxton et al. (1999) and Gordon (1997) for
the U.S., respectively 1.49% and 1.56%.
The convex Phillips curve country estimates are reported in Table 4
Table 4. Estimated Convex Phillips Curves: 1986:1-2006:417
πt = λπet + γ
³
UN−Ut
Ut−ϕ
´
+ επt γ λ LM σε
Australia 1.39∗ 0.65∗∗ 1.56 2.40
France 2.72∗ 0.44∗∗ 1.82† 1.42
Germany 0.86∗ 0.64∗∗ 1.65† 2.70
New Zealand 0.65† -0.44 1.91† 3.68
Sweden 0.07† 0.78∗∗ 1.24 4.96
United Kingdom -0.31 0.59∗ 1.55 2.44
United States 0.29 0.76∗∗ 1.30 0.62
16Superscripts ∗∗, ∗ and † denote rejection of the null hypothesis of zero coeﬃcients at
1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively, under the t-distribution. LM is the Breusch-Godfrey
F -statistic for the null of no residual autocorrelation up to 12 lags. σε is the standard
error of the regression (quarterly, at annual rates). The error terms follow low-order MA
processes–not reported to save space–to absorb residual autocorrelation.
17The natural rate estimates are the unemployment averages reported in Table 3.
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The least-squares estimates in Table 4 suggest that the convex curvature
(γ) is modestly large and significant for France, Germany and Australia, but
not for Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. The estimated values of λ are less than
one and mostly significant.18 For illustration purposes, Figure 3 compares
the fitted linear (in red) and convex functions (in blue) for the U.S. and the
Euro area, along with scatter plots of the unemployment rate and inflation
diﬀerential, defined as πt−πet . For the Euro area we have used ϕ = 5 percent,
reflecting its higher average unemployment rates.
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Figure 3: Linear and convex Phillips curves, United States and Euro area19
For the U.S., it can be observed that the convex model’s fit is not substan-
tially diﬀerent from the linear benchmark. In contrast, for the Euro area the
18Allowing λ < 1 in the estimation would cause collinearity, as πt−1 is already included
in πet . The smaller sample size for New Zealand may explain the wrong sign of λ.
19The U.S data is from 1986:1-2006:4. Inflation in the Euro-area is the annualized
quarterly percentage change in the CPI, 1991:1-2006:4. Source: European Central Bank.
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convex Phillips curve fits the inflation diﬀerential-unemployment rate data
better. This stylized observation was also reached by Dolado et al. (2005)
using a quadratic Phillips curve. The Euro area’s more outlying observations
are likely due to higher nominal wage rigidity; see Nickell (1997).
Overall, the regression results should be treated with caution on account
of the small sample size and the simple dynamic specification. After con-
trolling for inflation persistence, the linear Phillips curve seems to fit the
U.S. and Swedish data better than the convex alternative, while for France
and Germany the reverse is the case. Neither model is appropriate for the
U.K., but both seem to fit the Australian data. These findings are broadly
consistent with Dolado et al. (2004, 2005), who report that the interest-rate
behavior resulting from a convex Phillips curve fits the experience of 3 Euro-
pean countries and the euro area, but not the U.S. We tentatively conclude
that the convex Phillips curve is relevant for the post-disinflation period in
developed countries’ monetary policy .
5.2 Numerical simulations: United States
We use numerical simulations to illustrate the convex-symmetric model’s
properties for the United States. From equation (10), expected inflation is
a function of period-t shocks and the model’s parameters. Imposing k = 1,
the equilibrium relation between average inflation and inflation variability is
assessed by evaluating inflation outcomes for a large number of shocks.
The simulations are based on the U.S. structural parameter estimates of
Laxton et al. (1999). Assuming the unobservable time-varying UNt process
has a unit root, and employing the Kalman filter to estimate the natural
rate from 1968:1-1997:1, these authors’ ML estimates for convex Phillips
curve (4) were: bγ = 4.71, bUN = 6.1 percent, and bϕt = max(0, UNt − 4) = 2.1
percent. Average unemployment over that period was 6.4 percent, yielding
an estimated mean unemployment gap of 0.3 percent. The annual inflation
target is set at 2%, without loss of generality.
We let σε vary between 0.5 and 2 in steps of size 0.01 and simulate 100, 000
one-period inflation outcomes at each step. Because inflation outcomes di-
verge as εt approach −γ, we use a uniform probability density function sym-
metric around zero. The standard deviation of a symmetric uniform pdf with
support [−a, a] is a/
√
3. Thus, using Laxton et al.’s regression standard error
estimate bσε = 1.49 as the benchmark, inflation shocks are generated from a
uniform with support [−
√
3bσε,√3bσε], or [−2.58, 2.58], implying εt > −bγ is
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always satisfied.20
The resulting combinations of average inflation and inflation standard
deviation (σε) are shown in the top panel of Figure 4
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Fig.4: Average inflation and inflation variability (k=1)
Figure 4: Simulated average U.S. inflation and inflation variability (k = 1)
In contrast to the linear-symmetric model, average inflation increases with
σε also if k = 1. Moreover, the rate of increase is higher as inflation becomes
more volatile for any given convex curvature. Average unemployment (not
shown) also increases in σε. Note that at σε = 1.49% average inflation is
above 4 percent, close to the historical average for the 1968:1-1997:1 period.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 presents the standard deviation of simulated
inflation (σπ) against that of inflation shocks (σε). This relationship is linear
for large sample sizes, as shown in equation (12).
20The results are robust to normally distributed shocks. However, a normal pdf would
have to be arbitrarily truncated to exclude extreme negative errors, i.e. big deflationary
surprises.
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Simulation results for the equilibrium relationship between average infla-
tion and unemployment rates when k = 1 are shown below
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Figure 5: Simulated average U.S. inflation and unemployment (k = 1)
Average inflation and unemployment co-move together. This has impor-
tant implications for monetary policy: it indicates that inflation and unem-
ployment are likely to be cointegrated also under prudent discretion. The
convexity of the slope reflects the improving short-run tradeoﬀ (lower sacrifice
ratio) as unemployment declines.
In order to simulate U.S. unemployment outcomes, we have applied three
diﬀerent uniform distributions of inflation control errors to equation (6). The
regression standard errors used to find the uniform pdf support for the sim-
ulations were: 0.62 (from the U.S. convex Phillips curve in Table 4), 1.49
(from the convex Phillips curve in Laxton et al. (1999)), and 1.56 (from the
linear Phillips curve in Gordon (1997)). Positive skewness is apparent from
the simulations reported in Table 5
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Table 5. U.S. unemployment skewness: simulation results21
Inflation control errors Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis
1. uni [±1.07], σε = 0.62 6.2 6.1 0.33 1.93
2. uni [±2.58], σε = 1.49 6.6 6.1 0.90 2.81
3. uni [±2.79], σε = 1.56 6.7 6.1 0.94 2.91
In all three cases, the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null of a normal un-
employment distribution at 0.99 confidence. As expected, positive skewness
is significantly smaller when the uniform shocks are calibrated to the stan-
dard error of inflation in the prudent discretion period (case 1) than to the
larger standard errors from 1967 to 1997 (cases 2 and 3). Recall that this
was also the case for the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 for the
U.S.; as argued by Laxton et al. (1999), it is harder to identify convexity in
small sample sizes. Overall, the simulation results suggest that the convex-
symmetric reduced form can readily account for asymmetric (right-skewed)
unemployment distributions.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper showed that combining symmetric losses with a convex Phillips
curve generates positive inflation bias in a reduced-form monetary policy
model. This result–obtained by Dolado et al. (2005) and Ruge-Murcia
(2003b) for asymmetric loss functions–holds also when the central bank
targets the natural unemployment rate, i.e., when discretionary policy is
prudent.
Identifying such a structural source of bias may have important normative
implications for designing monetary institutions, e.g., inflation targets and
performance contracts for central bankers. It suggests an additional source of
excess average inflation stemming from the interaction of the convex Phillips
curve and the shock distribution. Such inflation bias may also be relevant
against the background of growing financial market instability since 2007 and
the global credit crisis in 2008. To the extent that the monetary authority
can aﬀect financial stability above and beyond keeping inflation low and
21The structural parameter values are as in Figs. 3 and 4. The sample mean, median
(in percent), skewness and kurtosis were computed for 100, 000 inflation control errors.
The empirical histograms are available upon request.
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stable, it is not clear that inflation targeting alone will deliver the optimal
amount of influence on financial stability as, with a convex Phillips curve,
more variable inflation is also higher on average. At the same time, this
equilibrium property has clear positive implications: it provides a distinct
motive for inflation stabilization even if the policy maker can precommit and
preferences are symmetric. It is also in line with proponents of enhancing
central bank credibility, as lower average inflation yields a first-order welfare
improvement; for example, Clarida et al. (1999).
Further, it was shown that average inflation increases in average unem-
ployment, and unemployment outcomes are positively skewed. The first re-
sult is important as it helps to account for the persistently positive correlation
between average inflation and unemployment since the mid-1980s, which is
impossible in the linear-symmetric model; see Ireland (1999). The second
result refers to actual unemployment, so it is empirically less controversial
than if it involved the output gap and the uncertainty over potential output
measures. Least-squares estimation and numerical methods indicated that
the convex-symmetric model is broadly consistent with developed economies’
experience during the “Great Moderation” period. A simple comparison also
suggested that the convex model fits the Euro-area’s data better than the
linear one, unlike the United States. This stylized finding, confirming that of
Dolado et al. (2005) using a quadratic Phillips curve in terms of the output
gap, is also consistent with higher average unemployment in Europe.
More generally, notwithstanding the empirical diﬃculties of identifying
convexity in the Phillips curve, a nonlinear policy reaction function may
be easier to assess if the underlying departure from certainty equivalence is
due to a structural parameter rather than an unobserved preference coeﬃ-
cient. In that respect, the convex alternative allows the symmetric inflation
aversion coeﬃcient (b) to be identified also under prudent discretion and
quadratic losses. Thus, to the extent that central banks’ (and society’s) rela-
tive weight on inflation stabilization may have changed significantly since the
early 1980s in response to economic events, inferring time-varying monetary
policy preferences from macroeconomic outcomes is a potential application
of the convex-symmetric reduced form.
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